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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : Cert. No. 
v. : 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., : 
a foreign corporation, : Priority No. 16 
RALPH PAHNKE and : 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 25, : 
: Court of Appeals 
Defendants, Appellees : Case No. 920228-CA 
and Petitioners. : 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke petition 
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari and review a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May a plaintiff who voluntarily withdraws from an 
action and allows the substitution of a new plaintiff, appeal the 
dismissal of the action? 
2. Is a trust beneficiary the proper party to 
commence an action against third parties for collection of trust 
assets allegedly distributed improperly from the trust, when 
there is no allegation the trustee has been asked to bring the 
action and has refused or when there is no allegation the 
interests of the trustee are hostile to the beneficiary? 
vi 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 
(Utah App. November 13, 1992). A copy is included in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
(a) Petitioners seek review of the decision entered 
November 13, 1992 by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(b) The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for 
Rehearing in an Order entered December 14, 1992. 
(c) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 and -2a-4 (Rep. Vol. 1992). 
LAW DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
There are no specific constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for collection of trust assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Anna Lee Anderson filed her complaint on December 6, 
1990, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah. On April 15, 1991, defendants Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. 
vii 
On July 22, 1991, an amended complaint was filed by 
David M. Dudley, a newly substituted plaintiff. Dean Witter and 
Ralph Pahnke moved to dismiss the amended complaint. 
The district court granted both motions to dismiss. 
The original complaint was dismissed on September 16, 1991; the 
amended complaint was dismissed on September 27, 1991. 
On October 9, 1991 Anna Lee Anderson appealed; David 
Dudley did not. Oral argument was heard on October 20, 1992. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Dean Witter and Mr. 
Pahnke filed a Petition for Rehearing. It was denied on December 
14, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background Information 
Norman Anderson created a trust in 1978, naming his 
wife, Anna Lee, as beneficiary. He appointed his only child, 
James, to serve as trustee. R.152. Norman died in 1979, and 
James Anderson assumed his duties as trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust. R.152. 
The Trust assets consisted almost exclusively of shares 
of stock held in an account in the Salt Lake City branch office 
of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. R.147. In May, 1980, the stock 
was distributed from the Trust's account, some going into James' 
personal account with Dean Witter and some going into his 
viii 
mother's personal account. R.147, Exhibit A; 152-154. Ralph 
Pahnke was the Dean Witter account executive for the transaction. 
R.147. 
Claims of the Parties 
On December 6, 1990, Anna Lee Anderson filed an action 
against Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah. R.la; Appendix C. 
She brought the action as beneficiary of the Trust. She 
contended the distribution of stock by the trustee violated the 
allocation scheme set forth in the Trust instrument and that Dean 
Witter and Ralph Pahnke, as stockbrokers, had a common law duty 
to supervise the trustee. She demanded money damages. 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss 
her complaint on April 15, 1991. R.40. They contended actions 
to recover trust assets must be brought by the trustee, not by 
the beneficiary and, therefore, Anna Lee lacked standing to sue 
and the trustee was an indispensable party. On July 16, 1991, 
the district court granted the motion from the bench, dismissing 
Anna Lee's complaint. R.91. 
On July 22, 1991, before the district court had entered 
the order of dismissal, an amended complaint was filed. R.92; 
Appendix D. Anna Lee was replaced as the named-plaintiff by 
David M. Dudley, the recently appointed successor trustee to 
James. R.92, 154. Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion 
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to dismiss Mr. Dudley's amended complaint on August 7, 1991. 
R.139. They contended Mr. Dudley's claims were time-barred 
because the complaint alleged the stock distribution occurred in 
May 1980 and the action was filed in December 1990, over ten 
years later. 
The district court signed an Order on September 16, 
1991, dismissing Anna Lee's complaint. R.214-216. It signed 
another Order on September 27, 1991, dismissing David Dudley's 
amended complaint. R.218-221. 
On October 9, 1991, Anna Lee filed a notice of appeal. 
R.224-225. The trustee, Mr. Dudley, was not named in the notice 
and he did not appeal. Appendix E. 
Disposition in the Court of Appeals 
On November 13, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
its opinion, reversing and remanding. It held Anna Lee Anderson 
had standing to bring an action as beneficiary to collect trust 
assets and that she could pursue this appeal. 
x 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Anna Lee Anderson cannot bring this action as 
beneficiary to recover Trust assets, absent allegations the 
trustee failed to bring it after demand or that the trustee's 
self-interest put him in a position adverse to hers. Anna Lee 
failed to make these allegations and the district court properly 
dismissed the action. 
Immediately following dismissal Anna Lee voluntarily 
withdrew as plaintiff in favor of the trustee. She later 
appealed. Anna Lee was no longer a party and could not appeal. 
The Court of Appeals determined both that Anna Lee 
could bring her action and that she could file this appeal though 
no longer a party. Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke petition the 
Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the Court 
of Appeal's decision. It ignores applicable legal authority and 
imposes unworkable rules of law on issues of appellate 
jurisdiction and the authority of a beneficiary to assert trust 
claims. 
Utah case authority does not address the standing of a 
former party to appeal after withdrawal. Other case law 
addresses the issue, however. It holds that a former party, 
after withdrawal from the action, cannot appeal. The Court of 
Appeal's decision is contrary to law. 
1 
The Court of Appeals' decision grants trust 
beneficiaries the unfettered authority to sue on behalf of a 
trust, without first demanding the trustee bring suit and without 
any determination that the trustee is unable to bring suit 
because of self-interest. The Court's ruling is contrary to law. 
The Court of Appeals' decision departs from accepted 
judicial proceedings within the meaning of Rule 46(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Morever, the Court decided an 
important question of state appellate jurisdiction which has not 
been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED ANNA LEE ANDERSON 
HAS STANDING TO APPEAL 
Anna Lee Anderson filed this action and later withdrew 
as plaintiff. She allowed another to be substituted as the sole 
plaintiff. Anna Lee was no longer a party to the action 
following substitution, and she lost all right to appeal. 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke advised the Court of 
Appeals about the jurisdictional problem posed by Anna Lee's 
withdrawal and her subsequent notice of appeal. See Brief of 
Respondents at 8-10. It was the subject of considerable 
discussion during oral argument. Nevertheless, the issue was 
relegated to a footnote in the opinion, and what analysis there 
is, ignores relevant facts and applicable, controlling case 
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authority. The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided the issue 
for several reasons: 
A. Anna Lee Anderson Substituted David M. Dudley As The 
Sole Plaintiff 
The Court of Appeals first mischaracterized the effect 
of Anna Lee's filing of the amended complaint by saying she 
"attempted to file a document labeled Amended Complaint . . . ," 
and that " . . . it was in substance an attempt to substitute a 
party plaintiff.11 Opinion, fn. 1 at 2. (emphasis added). It was 
not an attempt. The First Amended Complaint was filed with the 
district court. Substitution of parties was an accomplished 
fact. 
The amended complaint was sufficient in and of itself 
to substitute Mr. Dudley as plaintiff upon fiing.1 Rule 15 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits free amendment of a 
complaint if done before a responsive pleading is filed. The 
only pleading filed by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke was a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It was not a responsive 
pleading. Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A motion to dismiss . . . is not a 
responsive pleading which would preclude an opponent from 
1
 Anna Lee's motion to amend the complaint, filed six days 
after the filing of the amended complaint, was superfluous. 
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amending a complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) %once as a 
matter of course.'") 
Rule 15's allowance of an amendment "once as a matter 
of course" permits substitution of parties. The amended 
complaint effectively changed plaintiffs. Anna Lee was no longer 
a party; she had been replaced by Mr. Dudley. Roberts v. Husky 
Industries. Inc.. 71 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (facing a 
motion to dismiss, plaintiff amended the complaint, before a 
responsive pleading was filed, to substitute new plaintiffs); 
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966) 
("Rule 15(a) may be used to substitute new plaintiffs."); Rosier 
v. Garron. Inc.. 199 S.E.2d 50, 55 (W. Va. 1973) ("[T]he federal 
courts . . . have uniformly held that under proper circumstances, 
a motion to substitute a party with property capacity to sue is 
appropriate under Rule 15."); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1474 at 549-52 (2d ed. 1990) ("[A] party may make 
a Rule 15(a) amendment to add, substitute, or drop parties to the 
action." (footnotes omitted; emphasis added.)) 
Anna Lee herself acknowledged substitution had been 
achieved. In a pleading filed with the district court she 
admitted: 
. . . Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint in this 
matter. The Amended Complaint substitutes David M. 
Dudley as Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as the 
Plaintiff therein. 
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R.178. She repeated the admission in a subsequent pleading 
before the district court. R.205-206. And# she admitted to the 
Court of Appeals in her opening appeal brief that she had "filed 
an Amended Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the 
Norman Anderson Trust as plaintiff . . . ." Brief of Appellant, 
5 4 at 12. 
The First Amended Complaint was filed. It substituted 
plaintiffs. Anna Lee ceased to be a party. 
B. The Court of Appeals Had the Authority and the Duty to 
Determine Jurisdiction 
Second, the Court of Appeals explained that the 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue depends on the amended 
complaint and, because it was reversing the dismissal of the 
original complaint and remanding, the Court would not reach any 
assignment of error based on the amended complaint. That the 
Court of Appeals could not do. The Court has the power and the 
duty to address every jurisdictional issue. It has recognized in 
prior decisions that "[t]he fundamental and initial inquiry of a 
court is always to determine its own jurisdictional 
authority. . . . " Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). That is true even to the point of the Court 
raising its own lack of jurisdiction. Coray v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 184 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1947). 
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C. Anna Lee Anderson Did Not Appeal a Final Order 
Third, the Court of Appeals held that, in any event, 
Anna Lee had appealed the dismissal of the original complaint, 
which was itself a final order. Not so. The first order of 
dismissal might have been final for appeal had Anna Lee not 
elected to amend the complaint before the order was entered. 
Having done that, the order was at best interlocutory for 
purposes of appeal because the controversy between the litigants 
had not ended. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 
(Utah 1979). 
In any event, the "finality" of the first dismissal 
order is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue raised here. The 
only appropriate question is, "Who can take the appeal of an 
otherwise final order?" Certainly not strangers to the action, 
nor those who at the time of appeal are no longer parties. Anna 
Lee, by her own admission, was no longer a party. She could not 
appeal. 
D. Anna Lee Anderson Is Not A Party and Cannot Appeal 
The Court of Appeals' decision ignores controlling case 
authority which holds that only parties to a lawsuit may appeal. 
An illustrative case is Maaicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson. 
924 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1991). Magicsilk was the original named 
plaintiff. Vader Group, the purchaser of Magicsilk's assets, 
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filed a motion to be substituted as plaintiff. The motion was 
granted. 
Vader subsequently refused to cooperate in discovery in 
open defiance of a court order. The trial court dismissed the 
action with prejudice as a result. A notice of appeal was filed 
in the name of Magicsilk. Id. at 125. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed the 
problem created by the substitution of Vader as plaintiff and the 
notice of appeal filed by Magicsilk. Accordingly, the court 
itself raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction which had been 
neglected by the parties during briefing. Id. at 124. It 
dismissed the appeal, observing: 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over Magicsilk's appeal. 
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse 
judgment. Marino v. Ortiz. 484 U.S. 301f 304, 108 
S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (per curiam); Bense v. 
Starling. 719 F.2d 241, 244 (7th Cir. 1983). Magicsilk 
Corp. of New Jersey, the only company listed on the 
notice of appeal, has not been a party to this suit 
since the district court granted Vader's motion to 
substitute. 
Id. at 125. 
Another illustrative case is Appeal of District of 
Columbia Nurses' Ass'n., 854 F.2d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In that 
case several individual nurses and their professional 
association, District of Columbia Nurses' Association ("DCNA"), 
brought an action challenging the failure of the District of 
Columbia to pay appropriate overtime pay under the Fair Labor 
7 
Standards Act. The District of Columbia contended DCNA lacked 
standing under the Act and in response, plaintiffs moved to amend 
their complaint to remove DCNA as a party. Their motion was 
granted. In spite of withdrawal, DCNA's name continued to appear 
in the caption. 
Some time later, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District of Columbia and against the individual 
nurses. A notice of appeal was filed in the name of DCNA. That 
prompted the Court of Appeals to make an inquiry: 
This court entered an order to show cause why the 
appeal should not be dismissed since the purported 
appellant was no longer a plaintiff at the time of the 
judgment and no remaining plaintiff had been identified 
as an appellant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1988) (court of appeals only has jurisdiction over 
appeals of parties identified in notice of appeal); 
United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (only party to district court action may note an 
appeal). 
Id. at 1449. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal. It 
noted the general rule "that an appellant must be a party to the 
proceedings in order to file an appeal." Id. at 1449. DCNA had 
voluntarily removed itself from the action and no longer 
considered itself a party. Id. at 1449. The court held: 
This appeal was noted by a former plaintiff that had 
become a stranger to the litigation. No remaining 
plaintiff noted an appeal . . . . 
Id. at 1451. Cf., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991). 
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Anna Lee Anderson was no longer a party after she withdrew 
from the action. She lost all right to appeal.2 
II. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THE TRUSTEE IMPROPERLY NEGLECTED TO 
BRING THIS ACTION 
The Court of Appeals held Anna Lee may bring her action 
since the first trustee, her son James, "improperly neglected" to 
bring it. The Court found "neglect" solely from the trustee's 
failure to bring suit. The Court's definition of neglect is 
indefensible. It would completely emasculate the general rule 
giving trustees the exclusive right to maintain trust actions. 
The Court's error is highlighted by the recent, 
well-reasoned opinion of Firestone v. Galbreath. 976 F.2d 279 
(6th Cir. 1992). Beneficiaries of a trust sued a trustee and 
third parties on several tort claims. The trial court dismissed 
the action, ruling the beneficiaries lacked standing to pursue 
trust claims against third parties. The beneficiaries were 
unable, even though given an opportunity to amend their 
complaint, to allege facts (i.e., prior demand on the trustee to 
2
 David M. Dudley was the only plaintiff remaining after 
substitution. Mr. Dudley was not named in the notice of appeal, 
however, and he is barred from pursuing this appeal. Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) ("The failure to name 
a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable 
* informality'; it constitutes a failure of that party to 
appeal."); Maaicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123, 
125 (7th Cir. 1991); Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Practice ("The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal . . . . " ) . 
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sue) necessary to overcome the general rule precluding them from 
pursuing trust claims. 
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals first reiterated that "generally only the 
trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust," but went on to 
note that "the law makes an exception where the trustee has 
refused or neglected to bring a demanded action," Id. at 284. 
The court rejected the beneficiaries' argument that the trustee's 
"improper neglect" was evidenced by the trustee's failure to 
bring suit: "This argument is a transparent exercise in 
semantics by the plaintiffs. Both terms, ^refuse' and %neglect,' 
presuppose a demand, which the trustee either will not or forgets 
to bring." Id. Without allegations of demand made to the 
trustee to bring suit for the trust, the beneficiaries lacked 
standing to pursue the action. 
Firestone correctly interpreted "neglect" and the Court 
of Appeals departed from it. The rule adopted by the Court of 
Appeals not only destroys the general rule giving trustees the 
exclusive right to bring trust claims, it also relieves 
beneficiaries who bring suit for trust claims from the 
application of any statute of limitation. Under the definition 
adopted by the Court of Appeals, whenever a beneficiary sues a 
third party for a trust claim, it will always mean the trustee 
"neglected" to sue. The interpretation is wrong. A trustee's 
10 
neglect to bring an action can only be established by allegations 
of demand that suit be brought, followed by the trustee's failure 
to act on that demand. 
It must be emphasized that the only fact to support the 
inference drawn by the Court of the trustee's neglect, was his 
failure to bring this suit. There are no allegations demand was 
made and refused or ignored.3 Absent those allegations, the 
Court of Appeals could not have determined Anna Lee comes within 
the exception. Anna Lee lacks standing. 
The sole authority cited by the Court of Appeals for 
its interpretation of "neglect" is Struble v. New Jersey Brewery 
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Struble does not define "neglect." It does address, however, a 
beneficiary's right to sue upon the trustee's failure to do so. 
Rather than accepting the Court of Appeal's overly broad approach 
— allowing a beneficiary to sue whenever the trustee does not — 
Struble requires the beneficiary to affirmatively allege a breach 
of trust by the trustee. That was not done here. 
III. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN ANNA LEE 
ANDERSON AND THE TRUSTEE 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted the exception that 
a beneficiary has standing to pursue a trust claim against a 
3
 The record makes clear that, far from ignoring or refusing 
to act, James brought suit as trustee on other Trust claims in 
1987 against these same defendants. R. 53. 
11 
third party if the interests of the trustee are hostile to the 
beneficiary. The Court incorrectly suggested, however, there is 
an indication of hostility between Anna Lee as beneficiary and 
her son, James, as original trustee. 
The Court of Appeals did not cite any evidence of 
hostility. Neither did it draw from the allegations in the 
complaint any inference of hostility between them. Nor could the 
Court. The most that can be said of the complaint is it alleges 
stock held by the Trust was transferred to James by Dean Witter 
and Ralph Pahnke. There is no allegation the trustee ever knew 
about the transfer, that he participated in it, or that he 
intended it to occur. 
The complaint goes to extraordinary lengths to insulate 
the trustee. The entire blame for the transfer is laid at the 
feet of Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke.4 Thus, the only 
reasonable inference to draw from the face of the complaint is 
that the trustee did not know anything was wrong. How then could 
the trustee's interests be hostile to the beneficiary's when they 
both allegedly were duped? 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals held a former party, after 
withdrawal from the action, can appeal. The ruling is contrary 
4
 Anna Lee blames Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke, stock 
brokers, for allowing her son, James, to administer and act on 
behalf of the Trust. She holds them to a higher standard than 
she does the trustee. The law does not impose such an elevated 
standard on stockbrokers. 
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to law from other jurisdictions, although not settled in Utah. 
The issue, an important question of appellate jurisdiction, 
should be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals also held a trust beneficiary 
has unfettered authority to sue on behalf of a trust, without 
first demanding the trustee bring suit and without any 
determination that the trustee is unable to bring suit because of 
self-interest. The ruling is contrary to law, and it creates 
unworkable rules for trust administration: making the 
beneficiary, not the trustee, responsible for litigation efforts 
and allowing a beneficiary to bring suit at any time, without 
regard for limitations. The Supreme Court should settle the 
issue. 
The Supreme Court should grant a writ of certiorari and 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED: January 13, 1993. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
JcteepirT. Palmer " 
Reid E. Lewis 
E. Jay Sheen 
Attorneys for Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. and 
Ralph Pahnke 
Defendants, Appellees and 
Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 13th day of January, 1993, four 
copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari were mailed to: 
James E. Morton 
Ron Wolthius 
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Anna Lee ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., Ralph 
Pahnke, and John Does 1 through 25, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 920228-CA 
FILED: November 13, 1992 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Jackson 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant, Anna Lee Anderson, appeals an 
order granting appellees' motion to dismiss 
based on Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), and 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
On November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
executed a trust agreement creating the Norman 
Anderson Trust. The trust was funded by stock 
held in a brokerage account with Dean Witter, 
Inc. (Dean Witter). Dean Witter had a copy of 
the trust agreement that outlined the terms and 
conditions for disbursement of trust assets 
James Anderson, the son of Norman Anderson, 
was named as trustee for the trust. Anna Lee 
Anderson, the wife of Norman Anderson, was 
the sole beneficiary of the trust. 
On May 8, 1980, stock was distributed, in 
violation of the terms of the trust, from the trust 
into accounts James Anderson and Anna Lee 
Anderson held with Dean Witter. The 
distribution was made pursuant to a letter 
authorizing the distribution prepared by Ralph 
Pahnke, an employee of Dean Witter 
Subsequent to the distribution of the stock, Dean 
Witter continued to manage Anna Lee 
Anderson's account. During the term of Dean 
Witter's management, the assets held m Anna 
Lee Anderson's account became worthless 
When Anna Lee Anderson learned of the 
improper distributions m December 1990, she 
filed a complaint against Pahnke and Dean 
Witter on December 6, 1990. She sought 
damages for breach of contract, tortious 
interference with contract, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and negligence The defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss on April 15, 1991, alleging 
that the complaint failed to state a claim 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the proper 
party did not bring the complaint and that the 
complamt failed to name the trustee as an 
indispensable party pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) 
and 19 ' The trial court entered an order 
dismissing the complamt on September 16, 
1991 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Anna Lee Anderson contends her 
complamt was improperly dismissed because (1) 
she was a proper party to bring the suit, and (2) 
the trustee was not an indispensable party to the 
action 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on 
Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court must accept the 
material allegations of the complamt as true, and 
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only 
if it clearly appears the complainant can prove 
no set of facts in support of his or her claims 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991); 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah 1990). The facts of the complaint are 
to be liberally construed and the court must 
consider all the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991). "Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial 
court's ruling no deference and review it under 
a correctness standard." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
The appellees allege that Anna Lee Anderson, 
as a beneficiary to the trust, was not the proper 
party to bring suit against them. Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), appellees allege Anna 
Lee Anderson failed to state a claim because she 
did not have a nexus with the claim. The trial 
court agreed and dismissed the complaint, 
finding the trustee should have brought the suit 
rather than the beneficiary. 
Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
is proper if the plaintiff fails to properly allege 
standing. See Ashe Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 
969 F.2d 868, 872 (10th Cir. 1992); Grider v. 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). 
Rule 17 provides insight concerning standing to 
sue in a trust action: "Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. ... [A] trustee of an express trust ... 
may sue in that person's name without joining 
the party for whose benefit the action is 
brought." Utah R. Civ. P. 17 (1992) (emphasis 
added).2 
Although Rule 17 clearly allows the trustee to 
sue on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not 
prevent the beneficiary from suing third parties 
directly: 
It should be noted that the enumerations 
[e.g., trustee and guardian] are couched in 
permissive language. The beneficial owner, 
therefore, is not precluded from suing, nor 
from joining with the legal title holder, nor 
from being joined, if the beneficial owner 
has the right sought to be enforced. Whether 
he has . . . will be determined by principles 
of substantive law. 
3A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice §17.12 at 17-118. (2d ed. 1992) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).3 
Although Utah substantive law is especially 
sparse in this area, it appears the beneficiary has 
the right to bring an action against a third party 
when the beneficiary's interests are hostile to 
those of the trustee. Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. 
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161 (1930). Other 
jurisdictions also allow a beneficiary to sue third 
parties directly. E.g., Alioto v. United States, 
593 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (in 
action where beneficiary has been damaged by 
trustee and third party, beneficiary may bring 
action against third party separately); Booth v. 
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 155 F. Supp. 755, 
761 (D.N.J. 1957) (where trustee transfers 
property in breach of trust with assistance of 
third parties, third parties are primarily liable to 
the beneficiary, rather than to the trustee; the 
right of the beneficiary against the third party is 
a direct right not derived through the trustee); 
Hoyle v. Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1987) (trust beneficiary may bring action 
for damages against third party for breach of 
trust agreement); Apollinari v. Johnson, 305 
N.W.2d 565, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) 
(beneficiary may sue third party without joining 
trustee). 
Further, most jurisdictions follow the general 
rule set out in Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§282 (1976), providing in part: 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an 
action at law or suit in equity or other 
proceeding against a third person if the 
trustee held the property free of trust, the 
beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in equity 
against the third person, except as stated in 
Subsections (2) and (3). 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or 
neglects to bring an action against the third 
person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit 
in equity against the trustee and the third 
person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the present situation, it is clear from the 
complaint the beneficiary could prove facts 
showing she had standing to bring suit against 
the third parties for the improper distribution of 
stock. She could show, at the very least, the 
trustee improperly "neglected" to bring action 
against the appellees when he waited over ten 
years after the improper transfer and still did not 
bring suit. See Struble v. New Jersey Brewery 
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 
337 (3rd Cir. 1984) (where trustee may sue and 
wrongfully fails to do so, the beneficiary may 
sue the party or parties the trustee failed to sue). 
We conclude Anna Lee Anderson stated a 
cause of action against the appellees because she 
could prove facts showing she had standing as 
beneficiary to pursue the claim. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in finding the trustee was the 
only proper party to bring the action. Because 
we find that Anna Lee was a proper party to 
bring suit, we need not reach appellees claim 
that because the trustee was the only party 
eligible to bring the action, the trustee should 
have been named as an indispensable party 
pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly dismissed Anna Lee 
Anderson's complaint because it is clear that she 
could prove f&cts showing she has standing to 
bring claims as a beneficiary against the 
appellees. Therefore, we reverse the decision of 
the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. After a minute entry dismissing the complaint, but 
prior to the entry of the order formally dismissing the 
complaint, Anna Lee Anderson attempted to file a 
document labeled "Amended Complaint" naming a 
substituted trustee as a party in the caption of the 
document. Otherwise the document was identical to 
the complaint. Accordingly, it was in substance an 
attempt to substitute a party plaintiff The trial court 
granted the motion to dismiss the "Amended 
Complaint" on September 27, 1991. The order did not 
state any ground or basis for the ruling but the motion 
claimed a statute of limitations bar. Although Anna 
Lee Anderson also appealed the dismissal of the 
"Amended Complaint," we need not reach that issue 
because we are reversing the dismissal of the original 
complaint. 
Appellees claim Anderson cannot appeal the original 
complaint because she was not listed as a party to the 
"Amended Complaint." However, because we are not 
reaching the issues presented in the "Amended 
Complaint" and subsequent motion to dismiss, and 
because Anderson is appealing a final order, we find 
that Anderson properly appealed the dismissal of the 
original complaint. See Salt Lake City Corp v 
Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979) 
2. Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial 
economy and fairness to the parties in litigation Kemp 
v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) "The 
reason the defendant has the right to have the cause of 
action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so 
that the judgment will preclude any action on the same 
demand by another and permit the defendant to assert 
all defenses or counterclaims available against the real 
owner of the cause " Id (quoting Shaw v Jeppson, 
121 Utah 155, 163, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (1952)) 
3. Utah Code Ann. §75-7-402(3)(z) (Supp 1992) also 
provides that a trustee has the power to "prosecute or 
defend actions, claims or proceedings for the 
protection of the trust assets and of the trustee in the 
performance of his duties " While this statute 
empowers the trustee to sue on behalf of the 
beneficiary, it does not preclude Anderson from suing 
in her capacity as beneficiary 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Anna Lee Anderson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
Ralph Pahnke, and John Does 1 
through 25, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
DEC 141992 
Q*zu<c: ;h3 Court 
l.Tssft Cout c& Appeats 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 920228-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellees' 
Petition for Rehearing, filed December 4, 1992, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellees' Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 14th day of December, 1992 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary^T/ Noonan 
ClericJof t h e Court 
o 
i M JAMES E. MORTON (A 3739) 
• ^ PAUL D. HATCH (#1418) 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., 
a foreign corporation, 
RALPH PAHNKE and 
JOHN DOES I through XXV, 
Defendants. Judged ':"."•-• s 
Plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson, by and through her counsel 
of record, Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, and for causes of 
action, complains against Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Anna Lee Anderson is an individual residing in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. is a foreign 
corporation and is doing business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, 
/ / • • • . 
COMPLAINT 
(JURY DEMANDED) 
C i v i l No. 9009 en it t> cJ 
3. Defendant Ralph Pahnke is an individual residing in 
the State of Utah. 
4. The true names and capacities of Defendants named 
herein as John Does I through XXV, inclusive, are unknown to 
Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious 
names. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to 
include their true names and capacities when the same have been 
ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants 
designated herein as John Does I through XXV were responsible, in 
some manner, based upon the acts and omissions set forth here-
after, for the events and occurrences referred to hereinafter and 
for the resulting injury and damage to Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
further alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as 
John Does I through XXV were, for all relevant periods, an agent 
or employee of the other Defendants herein, and were at all times 
hereinafter mentioned acting within the purpose and scope of said 
agency or employment. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
executed a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson 
Trust. 
6. On or about November 28, 1978, Plaintiff Anna Lee 
Anderson executed a Trust Agreement which created the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust. 
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7. In addition, during the approximate same period of 
time, both Norman Anderson and Anna Lee Anderson executed their 
respective Last Wills and Testaments. 
8. Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of 
the Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman 
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust. Included 
in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi 
Straus & Co. 
9. James N. Anderson, Norman Anderson and Anna Lee 
Anderson's son, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust. 
10. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
at its Salt Lake City office. 
11. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished 
a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such 
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
12. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a 
copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust depart-
ment located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San 
Francisco, California. 
13. The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California reviewed said Trust Agreement and sent 
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds, 
3 
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of 
the Norman Anderson Trust. 
14. The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", provides for the creation 
upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely, a 
"Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust". 
15. The provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the 
Trustee, with respect to the maintenance, administration, manage-
ment, and distribution of assets held in said Trust. 
16. The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to dis-
tribute income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at 
least a quarterly basis. 
17. In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee 
to make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her 
care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of 
residences. 
18. The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee 
may make distributions of principal to any person designated in 
writing by Anna Lee Anderson. 
19. The Family Trust allows the Trustee to make 
distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income 
from all other sources (including the Marital Trust) are insuffi-
cient for her care, comfort, support and maintenance. 
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20. The Family Trust provides for the distribution of 
the balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's 
death. 
21. On or about May 8, 1980, Defendant Ralph Pahnke 
prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000 
shares of the common stock of Levi Straus & Co. as follows: 
a. 24,118 shares were distributed to the personal 
securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N. 
Anderson; 
b. 16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
22. The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-
buted to James N. Anderson amounted to $871,238.63. 
23. The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-
buted to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36. 
24. Neither of the distributions were in accordance 
with the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke 
and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
25. Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust Account. During the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.fs 
management of such Trust Account, the Trust Account became 
valueless. 
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26. The distributions induced by and affected by 
Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful, 
and in direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman 
Anderson Trust Agreement. 
27. Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Rey-
nolds, Inc. owed Anna Lee Anderson, the beneficiary of the Norman 
Anderson Trust, a duty of inquiry and a duty of good faith dealing 
when effectuating transactions with the Trustee of such Trust. 
28. In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. were required by applicable law to not assist, 
induce, aid, abet, or in any other manner facilitate transactions 
that were in violation Qf the terms of the Trust Agreement. 
29. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. was malicious, and wholly without good cause or 
good faith. 
30. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful, 
illegal, negligent, and unconscionable acts of Defendants Pahnke 
and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
32. When Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. accepted an account with the Norman Anderson Trust, they con-
6 
tracted with said Trust to comply with applicable rules and 
regulations of the New York Stock Exchange, the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, as well as Federal and State law. 
33. In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. contracted to manage the accounts with the highest 
standards of fair dealing. 
34. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. as hereinabove alleged constitutes a breach in 
violation of the third party beneficiary contract existing between 
Anna Lee Anderson and Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT) 
35. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
36. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. hereinabove alleged constitutes an unlawful and 
tortious interference with the contract rights of Plaintiff. 
37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s unlawful and tortious 
conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at 
trial. 
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38. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s 
conduct was wholly without good cause or good faith. 
39. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter. 
40. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees in connection with the prosecution of this action, 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY) 
41. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
42. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
carefully reviewed the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement to the extent that such Trust Agreement was 
forwarded to the Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California for scrutiny. 
43. In accepting the Norman Anderson Trust and opening 
a securities account for said Trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean 
Witter Reynolds became de facto trustees of the Norman Anderson 
Trust. 
44. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
owed Plaintiff the degree of care and loyalty imposed upon 
trustees by applicable law. 
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45. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
breached and violated their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff in 
undertaking the wrongful conduct as hereinabove alleged. 
46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s breach of fiduciary duty, 
Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
47. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of. punitive 
damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter. 
48. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with the prosecution of 
this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENCE) 
49. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein• 
50. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
owed Plaintiff a duty to not induce or facilitate the violation of 
any provision of the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement. 
51. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
breached and violated their duty to Plaintiff as hereinabove 
alleged. 
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52. As a direct and proximate result of the careless, 
negligent, reckless, and unlawful acts and omissions of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., jointly and severally, 
as follows: 
A. On Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for breach of 
contract, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For costs of Court incurred herein; and 
(iii) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
B. On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for tortious 
interference with contract, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated 
to punish and deter; 
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
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(iv) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
C. On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for breach of 
fiduciary duty, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated 
to punish and deter; 
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
(iv) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
D. On Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for negli-
gence, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For costs of Court incurred herein; and 
(iii) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
/ ^ 
DATED this b day of December, 1990. 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
By_ ffi&LL 
James E. Morton 
Paul D. Hatch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, 
Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, hereby demands a trial by jury in 
this matter. 
DATED this 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
O day of December, 1990. 
By_ PJ/MU 
James E. Morton 
Paul D. Hatch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
866 16th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made this /JL6 day of 
y^c-VV\?SE.vL r 1978, between NORMAN .ANDERSON of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter sometimes called the "Trustor" 
and JAMES N. ANDERSON, of Park City, Utah, hereinafter 
sometimes called the "Trustee". 
Trustor does hereby transfer to the Trustee the 
property listed on Schedule "A" and the Trustee agrees to 
hold such property and any other property added to this 
Trust on the terms and conditions stated herein. Trustor 
or any other person or persons may add such other property 
to the trust property as may be acceptable to the Trustee 
by either inter vivos or testamentary 'transfer; and such 
additional property when delivered to the Trustee shall 
become a part of the Trust and be held by the Trustee on 
the terms and conditions stated herein. 
ARTICLE I 
DESIGNATION AND PURPOSE OF TRUST 
1.1 Designation. This Trust may be designated 
the NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST. 
1.2 Purpose. This Trust is established for the 
primary benefit of Trustor during Trustor's lifetime and 
of Trustor's family. Trustor's family consists of Trustor's 
wife, Anna Lee Anderson, and Trustor's son, James N. 
Anderson. 
kXHiriT 
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ARTICLE II 
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL 
DURING THE LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR 
During the lifetime of the Trustor, such paxt 
or all of the income and/or principal of the trust es%tate 
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such 
amounts from time to time as the Trustor shall direct m 
writing signed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee; or in 
the absence of such direction, the Trustee shall pay or 
apply for the benefit of a class consisting of Trustor 
and Trustor's wife or any member of such class, such 
amounts to such persons as in his sole and absolute dis-
cretion he deems necessary and proper for the health, 
support, maintenance and welfare of Trustor and said 
wife. 
ARTICLE III 
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL 
UPON DEATH OF TRUSTOR 
3.1 Settlement of Debts and Expenses. Upon 
the death of the Trustor, the Trustee may, in th sole and 
absolute discretion of the Trustee, pay from the Trust or 
advance such sums to the estate or personal representative 
of Trustor, with or without interest, as may be necessary 
for the settlement of Trustor's estate, such amounts as 
expenses of his last illness, funeral and burial, debts 
of the Trustor, inheritance taxes, estate taxes and other 
-3-
taxes imposed by the state or federal government, and any 
and all expenses of administration of Trustor's estate. 
Provided, however, that the foregoing may not be satisfied 
from the proceeds (i) of any life insurance policy on the 
life of Trustor, or (ii) of any death benefit payable by 
reason of the Trustor having been a participant in an employee 
benefit plan if such proceeds are not included in the 
Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 
3.2 Trustor's Family. Upon the death of Trustor, 
the Trustee may make the payments provided in Section 3.1, 
if any, or make adequate provision therefor, and shall 
divide and distribute the trust estate then remaining, 
including income, as follows: 
3.2.1 Wife Not Surviving. If Trustor's 
wife does not survive Trustor (and it is hereby 
directed that for purposes-of this Trust if 
Trustor and Trustor's wife shall die under 
circumstances that it is difficult or impossible 
to determine who died first, Trustor's wife shall 
be presumed to have survived Trustor), the .Trustee 
shall hold, administer and distribute the trust 
estate, including all assets distributable to 
the Trust by reason of the death of Trustor, in 
one Trust, to be called the "Family Trust" to 
be administered as provided in 3.4. 
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3.2.2 Wife Surviving. If Trustor's wife 
does survive Trustor, the Trustee shall divide 
the trust estate, including all assets distribu-
table to the Trust by reason of the death of 
Trustor, into two separate trusts, the first to 
be called the "Marital Trust" and the second the 
"Family Trust" to be administered as provided in 
3-3 and 3.4. 
A. Marital Trust Allocation. There 
shall be placed in the Marital Trust 
that portion of the trust estate which 
is equal in value, as finally determined for 
federal estate tax purposes, to the amount 
which is equal to the lesser of: 
(1) The maximum allowable marital 
deduction under federal estate tax laws; 
or 
(2) The minimum amount which, after 
allowing for any unified credit which has 
not been allowed during Trustor's life-
time, and any other deductions, exemptions 
or credits which will result in no federal 
estate tax being imposed on Trustor's 
estate. 
and which is reduced by the value of any property 
or any interests in property as finally determine) 
for federal estate tax purposes which passes 
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or has passed from Trustor to Trustor's wife, 
other than through the Marital Trust, by 
reason of said wife being a surviving 'joint 
tenant, or an insurance beneficiary, inchoate 
dower or any statutory interest similar 
thereto, by operation of law, or otherwise. 
However, there shall not be allocated to the 
Marital Trust, any property or interest in 
property or the proceeds of any property or 
assets which do not qualify for the marital 
deduction for federal estate tax purposes; 
nor shall there be allocated to the Marital 
Trust except when other assets are insuffi-
cient to satisfy such fractional share, any 
property or interest in property or the 
proceeds -of any property or assets (i) with 
respect to which any tax credit or deduction 
shall be available because it is subject to 
both federal estate and federal income tax; 
or (ii) with respect to which any estate or 
death taxes are paid to any foreign country 
or any of its possessions or subdivisions. 
The Marital Trust shall not be reduced for 
any inheritance or estate taxes, payable as 
a result of the death of Trustor. The Trustee • 
must allocate to the Marital Trust property 
or assets, including cash, fairly representative 
-6-
of the appreciation or depreciation in the 
value of all property available for distri-
bution to such Trust. 
B. Family Trust Allocation. There 
shall be placed in the Family Trust that 
portion of the trust estate not allocated 
to the Marital Trust. 
3.3 Marital Trust. The estate and property of the 
Marital Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts as 
follows: 
3.3.1 Distribution During Lifetime of Wife. 
During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after Trustor's 
death: 
A. The Trustee shall pay to the 
Trustor's wife, commencing as of the date of 
Trustor's death, all of the income from the 
Trust in monthly or other convenient install-
ments, but in no event less frequently than 
in quarter-annual installments; and 
B. Whenever the Trustee determines that 
the funds available to Trustor's wife from 
all sources, including the income from the 
Marital Trust, are not sufficient for the 
proper care, maintenance, support and travel, 
including but not limited to the needs arising 
from illness, accident or misfortune of 
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Trustor's wife and family, and for funds 
to enable the purchase of residences, the 
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, 
may in his sole discretion pay or distribute 
to Trustor's wife so much of the principal 
of the Trust as he shall deem necessary or 
advisable under the circumstances. 
C. The Trustee shall pay out of 
principal of the Marital Trust such amount 
or amounts, up to the full amount thereof, 
as Trustor's wife shall from time to time 
designate in writing delivered to Trustee 
to any person or persons, including Trustor's 
wife. 
3.3.2 Distributions on Death of Wife. Upon 
the death of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall pay 
over, deliver and distribute all of the rest, 
residue and remainder of the Trust to such per-
sons and parties, including the estate of Trustor's* 
wife, as Trustor's wife shall direct or appoint by 
provision of the last will of said wife specifically 
referring to this power of appointment; to the 
extent this general power of appointment is not 
exercised, then upon the death of Trustor's wife 
the Trustee shall continue to hold, administer 
and distribute the remainder of the Marital Trust 
as shall not have been appointed by Trustor's 
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wife, subject to and under the provisions of 3.4. 
3.4 Family Trust. The estate and property of the 
Family Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts 
as follows: 
3.4.1 Distributions During Lifetime o'f 
Wife. During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after 
Trustor's death, whenever the Trustee determines 
that the funds available to Trustor's wife from all 
sources, including the income and principal from 
the Marital Trust are not sufficient for the proper 
care, maintenance, support and travel, including but 
not limited to the needs arising from illness, 
accident or misfortune of Trustor's wife, and for 
funds to enable the purchase of residences, the 
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, may 
in his sole discretion pay or distribute to Trustor's 
wife so much of the income and/or principal of the 
Trust as he shall deem necessary or advisable under the 
circumstances. 
3.4.2 Distribution on Death of Wife, Upon 
the death of Trustor's wife, if Trustor's wife 
survives Trustor; the Trustee shall distribute the 
remainder of the Family Trust to or for the benefit 
of a class or any member or members thereof con-
sisting of Trustor's son, the descendants of Trustor's 
son, including any of such descendants now living 
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or hereafter born, the spouses of Trustor's son and 
the spouses of the descendants of Trustor's son 
(including surviving spouses of Trustor's deceased 
son and his descendants) as Trustor's wife shall direct 
or appoint by provision of the last will of said 
wife specifically referring to this special power 
of appointment; to the extent this special power, of 
appointment is not exercised, then upon the death 
of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall distribute 
the remainder of the Family Trust as shall not have 
been appointed by Trustor's wife to Trustor's son, 
James N. Anderson, if he is then living, but if he 
is not then living to Trustor's son's then living 
descendants, upon the principle of representation, 
subject to the provisions of 3.5. If none of the 
descendants of Trustor are then-living, the Trustee 
shall distribute the entire trust estate to the 
heirs at law of Trustor as determined pursuant to 
the laws of descent and distribution of the State 
of Utah in effect at such time as if Trustor had 
died at such time. 
3.4.3 Distribution on Death of Trustor. 
Upon Trustor's death if Trustor's wife does not 
survive Trustor, the Trustee shall distribuye the 
Family Trust to Trustor's son, James N. Anderson, 
if he is then living but if he is not then living to 
Trustor's son's then living descendants upon the 
principle of representation, subject to the provisions 
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of 3.5. If none of "the descendants of Trustor are 
then living, the Trustee shall distribute the entire 
trust estate to the heirs at law.of Truster as deter-
mined pursuant to the laws of descent and distri^ 
bution of the State of Utah in effect at such time 
as if Trustor had died at such time. 
3.5 Minor Beneficiaries Trust. If under any 
provision of this Trust any beneficiary becomes entitled 
to final distribution of any share or portion of the trust 
estate and such beneficiary is not of the age of 21 years, 
the share of such beneficiary shall be retained by the 
Trustee, until such beneficiary attains the age of 21 
years, paying out such portion of the income and principal 
thereof as the Trustee in its sole discretion deems necessary 
or advisable to provide for the care, comfort, support, 
maintenance and education of such beneficiary and distri-
buting any undistributed portion of such share or portion 
of a share to such beneficiary when he or she attains 
the age of 21 years, or to his or her estate if he or 
she should die before attaining the age of 21 years. 
ARTICLE IV 
AMENDMENT OR REVOCATION 
4.1 During Lifetime of Trustor. The Trustor 
reserves the right at any time or times to amend or revoke 
this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in 
part, by an instrument or instruments in writing signed 
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by Trustor and delivered in Trustor's lifetime to the 
Trustee. If this instrument is revoked in its entirety, 
the revocation shall take effect upon the delivery of the 
required writing to the Trustee. On the revocation of this 
instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to 
the Trustor, or as Trustor may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the trust property. 
4.2 By Will of Trustor. The Trustor reserves 
the right to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts 
hereunder, in whole or in part, by his last will which 
specifically refers to this instrument and specifically 
directs what amendments are to be made or states that 
the instrument is revoked. If this instrument is revoked 
in its entirety by the last will of the Trustor, the Trustee 
shall deliver to the Trustor's estate, or as Trustor's 
will may direct, all of the trust property. 
4.3 Acceptance by Trustee. If this Trust or 
any provision thereof is amended, the amendment shall 
take effect only when accepted in writing by the Trustee. 
This Trust shall be irrevocable and unamendable during 
any period of incompetency, of the Trustor and shall become 
irrevocable and unamendable upon the death of the Trustor 
or prior thereto if by amendment Trustor has relinquished 
all of Trustor's right to amend or revoke this instrument. 
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ARTICLE V 
POWERS OF TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall have all of the powers as- stated 
in Part 4 of Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and 
entitled Uniform Trustee's Powers Provisions. In addition 
thereto and not by way of limitation, the Trustee shall 
have the power, to retain any asset originally or later 
contributed to the trust estate whether or not such asset 
be of a character permissible for investment by fiduciaries; 
to retain and purchase assets with a view to possible 
increase in value notwithstanding the amount or absence 
of income therefrom; to retain and purchase assets not-
withstanding the lack of diversification of the trust 
assets; to retain, purchase, sell or exchange any and all 
stocks, bonds, notes or other securities or any variety 
of real or personal property, including stocks or mteres-ts 
in investments, mutual funds to make distributions of 
principal or income in kind; to enter into any transaction, 
including, but not limited by advancing funds, purchasing 
assets, selling assets (and paying, with or without arrange-
ments for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settle-
ment of the estate of Trustor) with the Trustee or legal 
representative of any other trust or estate in which any 
beneficiary hereunder has any beneficial interest even thougn 
such Trustee or legal representative is also Trustee here-
under; and to commingle the funds and assets of any trust 
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estate hereunder with any other trust estate hereunder so 
long as proper records are kept of the assets allocable 
to any such trust. 
ARTICLE VI 
INSURANCE PROVISIONS 
6.1 Power in the Trustor. The Trustor reserves 
the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent 
or approval of the Trustee, to sell, assign or hypothecate 
any policies of insurance made payable to the Trustee-
hereunder, to exercise any option or privilege granted by 
such policies, including, but without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiary of 
such policies, and to receive all payments, dividends, 
surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind which 
may accrue on account of such policies during Trustor's 
lifetime. Furthermore, the Trustee agrees to deliver to 
the Trustor on Trustor's written request signed by Trustor 
and delivered to Trustee any of such policies deposited 
with the Trustee hereunder. 
6.2 Duties of Trustee. The Trustee shall hold 
any policies of insurance which may be deposited with 
him, but without any obligation to pay premiums, assess-
ments or other charges upon any of the policies or to 
otherwise preserve them or any of them as binding con-
tracts of insurance. Upon the death of the insured or 
upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payable 
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to the Trustee, the Trustee shall take such proceedings as 
in his judgment he shall deem necessary to collect all 
proceeds due on the policies and he may, if he so elects, 
exercise any settlement options available under the policies. 
The Trustee is authorized to compromise and adjust claims 
arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terms 
and conditions as the Trustee shall deem advisable, and to 
the extent necessary may maintain or defend any suit, 
provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no duty 
to maintain or enter into any litigation unless his expenses,' 
including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or 
guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably satis-
factory to the Trustee. The Trustee may repay any advances 
made by him or reimburse himself for any such fees and costs 
out of the principal or income of this Trust. The receipt 
of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge 
of the insurer and Trustee alone shal] thereafter be required 
to see to the application of the proceeds. 
ARTICLE VII 
THE TRUSTEE 
7.1 Accounting. With respect to each separate 
trust created herein, the Trustee shall render annually 
an account of income and principal, including a statement 
of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to 
all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to 
the natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries, upon, 
but only upon the request of any such beneficiary. 
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7.2 Bond. No bond shall be required of the 
original Trustee hereunder or of any successor trustee 
or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond 
shall be required. 
7.3 Compensation. The Trustee shall be entitled 
to a reasonable fee for his services commensurate with 
fees charged by corporate trustees in Salt Lake City, Utah 
for similar services. The Trustee may charge a reasonable 
fee for transfers to a successor trustee and for any final 
distribution of any share of the trust estate based upon the 
work involved in such transfer or final distribution. 
7.4 Resignation. The Trustee may resign at any 
time by giving thirty (30) days written notice to Trustor, 
or, after the death of the Trustor, to Trustor's wife. 
Upon such notice, Trustor, or after the death of Trustor, 
Trustor's wife may appoint a successor trustee. If no such 
appointment is made within thirty (30) days after the 
Trustee gives its notice of resignation, then the District 
Court of Salt Lake County or any judge thereof may appoint 
a successor trustee upon application of the resigning 
Trustee or of any other interested party. 
7-5 Removal. The Trustee may be removed by the 
Trustor or after the death of the Trustor, by Trustor's 
wife by giving thirty (30) days written notice signed 
by Trustor, or Trustor's wife, as the case may be and 
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delivered to Trustee, in which the successor trustee 
is designated to the then acting Trustee. 
7.6 Successor Trustee. A successor trustee may 
be either a corporation authorized under applicable law to 
act as trustee or an individual. Any such successor trustee 
shall act as Trustee hereunder without the execution or 
filing of any writing or any further action on the part of 
Trustor or of his wife or of any beneficiary hereunder. Upon 
the appointment of a successor trustee, the former Trustee 
shall promptly make an accounting and distribute all 
assets of the trust estate to the successor trustee. An 
additional or successor trustee shall not be liable for 
any action taken by the Trustee prior to the time such 
additional or successor trustee becomes a trustee. 
ARTICLE VIII 
MISCELLANEOUS 
8.1 Powers of Appointment. The power of the 
donee over any power of appointment granted in this agree-
ment shall include all lawful exercises thereof, without 
limitation, specifically including but not limited to, 
the power to make appointments outright to, or to a trustee 
to hold in trust for the exclusive benefit of, any one or 
more of the object of the power; to create life estates 
and other limited estates; to create general and special 
powers of appointment and to appoint subject to lawful 
spendthrift restrictions and other lawful conditions, pro-
vided that no one other than an object of the power is 
benefited thereby. 
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8.2 Spendthrift Clause. The interest of each 
beneficiary in the income or principal of any trust created 
hereunder shall be free from the control or interference 
of any creditor of a beneficiary or of any spouse of a 
married beneficiary and shall not be subject to attachment 
or susceptible of anticipation or alienation. Nothing con-
tained in this paragraph 8.2 shall be construed as restricting 
in any way the exercise of any power or discretion granted 
hereunder. 
8.3 Definitions. References herein to "child" 
or "children" refer only to the child designated in 
Article I. References herein to "descendant" or "descendants" 
shall mean lawful blood descendants in the first, second or 
other degree of the ancestor designated and, in all such 
cases, (a) an adopted child and such adopted child's law-
ful blood descendants shall be considered as lawful blood 
descendants of the adopting parent or parents and of anyone 
who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting 
parent or of either of the adopting parents, and (b) a 
child in gestation which is later born alive shall be 
regarded as a child in being during the period of gestation. 
8.4 Governing Law. This agreement has been 
accepted by the Trustee in the State of Utah and all 
questions concerning its construction shall be governed 
by the laws of that state. All questions concerning the 
administration of the Trust shall be governed by the laws 
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of the jurisdiction in which the principal office of the 
Trustee (from time to time acting) is located. 
8.5 Invalid Provisions. If any provision of 
this Trust is held to be invalid, none of the other pro-
visions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative, 
but such provisions shall be given full force and effect 
as herein provided. If any provisions of this trust 
instrument violate the rules against perpetuities now or 
hereafter in effect, in the state within which this Trust 
is being administered, that portion of the trust or trusts 
so affected shall be administered as herein provided until 
the termination of the maximum period authorized by law, 
at which time and forthwith such part of the said trust 
estate so affected shall be distributed in fee simple to 
the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in 
which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so 
terminated. For purposes of computing such time rules, 
the lives in being shall be those of the Trustor, Trustor's 
wife and their descendants living at the time the trust 
or trusts herein established become irrevocable. 
8.6 Residence Property. If any residence of 
Trustor or Trustor's wife is or becomes a part of any 
trust estate created hereunder, the Trustee is authorized 
and directed to allow Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either 
of them, to use and occupy any such residence without payment 
of rent therefor for so long as Trustor and Truster's wife, 
or either of them, continue to so occupy such residence or 
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residences. During such occupancy, Trustor hereby authorizes 
but does net direct Trustee, to pay, in his discretion, 
from the income or principal of the trust estate which 
holds an interest in any such residence, any taxes, assess-
ments, fire and casualty and liability insurance premiums, 
maintenance costs, ordinary repairs and replacements and 
reasonable improvements for any such residence. With the 
written consent of Trustor, or after Trustor's death, 
Trustor's wife, signed by Trustor or Trustor's wife, as 
the case may be, and delivered to Trustee, the Trustee 
may sell such residence. If requested in such writing 
the proceeds of the sale (together with any additional 
assets of the trust estate) shall be used by the Trustee 
to purchase, acquire, or build a substitute residence, 
taking title in the name of the Trustee and allowing 
Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either of them, to occupy 
such residence on the terms previously set out in this 
paragraph. If a substitute residence is not requested in 
such writing, the proceeds of the sale of any such residence 
shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustee 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust estate involved without 
regard to this paragraph. 
8.7 Trustee May Rely on Wills - Presumption 
In ascertaining whether there has been an amendment of this 
Trust by the last will of the Trustor or whether there has 
been an exercise of any powers which have been granted to 
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any beneficiary herein and which may be exercised by any 
such beneficiary's last will, the Trustee shall be protected 
in relying upon an instrument admitted to probate in any 
jurisdiction as the last will of the Trustor or as the last 
•will of any beneficiary who has such a power. Unless the 
Trustee has actual notice of the admission to probate of 
such a will within 6 months after the death of Trustor or 
any such beneficiary, it will be conclusively presumed 
that no such will has been admitted to probate, that no 
such will exists and that the Trustor or beneficiary, as 
the case may be, died intestate and the trust estate shall 
be administered accordingly whether or not such a will is 
thereafter found to exist. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOr, this instrument has been 
signed as of the day and year first above written. 
NORJ1AN ANDERSON 
. , : . : : • • ^ 
" T r u s t o r " 
JAMES N. ANDERSON 
/A; .,., / / / / . / . .,„v 
/ I " T r u s t e e ' 
JAMES E. MORTON (A 3739) 
PAUL D. HATCH (#1418) 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID M. DUDLEY, Trustee of the ) 
NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST, ) 
) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, ) (JURY DEMANDED) 
VS. ) 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ) 
a foreign corporation, ) 
RALPH PAHNKE and ) 
JOHN DOES I through XXV, ) Civil No. 900907186 CN 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff, David M. Dudley as Trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust, by and through his counsel of record, Thompson, 
Hatch, Morton & Skeen, and for causes of action, complains against 
Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. David M. Dudley is an individual acting as Trustee 
of the Norman Anderson Trust. 
2. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. is a foreign 
corporation and is doing business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. Defendant Ralph Pahnke is an individual residing in 
the State of Utah. 
4. The true names and capacities of Defendants named 
herein as John Does I through XXV, inclusive, are unknown to 
Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious 
names. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to 
include their true names and capacities when the same have been 
ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants 
designated herein as John Does I through XXV were responsible, in 
some manner, based upon the acts and omissions set forth here-
after, for the events and occurrences referred to hereinafter and 
for the resulting injury and damage to Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
further alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as 
John Does I through XXV were, for all relevant periods, an agent 
or employee of the other Defendants herein, and were at all times 
hereinafter mentioned acting within the purpose and scope of said 
agency or employment. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
executed a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson 
Trust. 
6. On or about November 28, 1978, Anna Lee Anderson, 
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the wife of Norman Anderson, executed a Trust Agreement which 
created the Anna Lee Anderson Trust. 
7. In addition, during the approximate same period of 
time, both Norman Anderson and Anna Lee Anderson executed their 
respective Last Wills and Testaments. 
8. Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of 
the Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman 
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust. Included 
in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi 
Straus & Co. 
9. James N. Anderson, Norman Anderson and Anna Lee 
Anderson's son, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust and has subsequently been 
replaced by David M. Dudley as Trustee for such Trust. 
10. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
at its Salt Lake City office. 
11. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished 
a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such 
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
12. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a 
copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust depart-
ment located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San 
Francisco, California. 
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13. The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California reviewed said Trust Agreement and sent 
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of 
the Norman Anderson Trust. 
14. The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", provides for the creation 
upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely, a 
"Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust". 
15. The provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the 
Trustee, with respect to the maintenance, administration, manage-
ment, and distribution of assets held in said Trust. 
16. The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to dis-
tribute income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at 
least a quarterly basis. 
17. In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee 
to make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her 
care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of 
residences. 
18. The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee 
may make distributions of principal to any person designated in 
writing by Anna Lee Anderson. 
19. The Family Trust allows the Trustee to make 
distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income 
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from all other sources (including the Marital Trust) are insuffi-
cient for her care, comfort, support and maintenance. 
20. The Family Trust provides for the distribution of 
the balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's 
death. 
21. On or about May 8, 1980, Defendant Ralph Pahnke 
prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000 
shares of the common stock of Levi Straus & Co. as follows: 
a. 24,118 shares were distributed to the personal 
securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N. 
Anderson; 
b. 16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
22. The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-
buted to James N. Anderson amounted to $871,238.63. 
23. The value of the Levi Straus & Co. stock distri-
buted to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36. 
24. Neither of the distributions were in accordance 
with the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke 
and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
25. Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust Account. During the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s 
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management of such Trust Account, the Trust Account became 
valueless. 
26. The distributions induced by and affected by 
Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful, 
and in direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman 
Anderson Trust Agreement. 
27. Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Rey-
nolds, Inc. owed Anna Lee Anderson, the beneficiary of the Norman 
Anderson Trust and the Trustee of said Trust, a duty of inquiry 
and a duty of good faith dealing when effectuating transactions 
with the Trustee of such Trust. 
28. In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. were required by applicable law to not assist, 
induce, aid, abet, or in any other manner facilitate transactions 
that were in violation of the terms of the Trust Agreement. 
29. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. was malicious, and wholly without good cause or 
good faith. 
30. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful, 
illegal, negligent, and unconscionable acts of Defendants Pahnke 
and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
32. When Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. accepted an account with the Norman Anderson Trust, they con-
tracted with said Trust to comply with applicable rules and 
regulations of the New York Stock Exchange, the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, as well as Federal and State law. 
33. In addition, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. contracted to manage the accounts with the highest 
standards of fair dealing. 
34. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. as hereinabove alleged constitutes a breach in 
violation of the contract existing between the Trust and Defend-
ants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT) 
35. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
36. The conduct of Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. hereinabove alleged constitutes an unlawful and 
tortious interference with the contract rights of Plaintiff. 
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37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s unlawful and tortious 
conduct, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at 
trial. 
38. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s 
conduct was wholly without good cause or good faith. 
39. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter. 
40. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees in connection with the prosecution of this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY) 
41. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
42. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
carefully reviewed the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement to the extent that such Trust Agreement was 
forwarded to the Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California for scrutiny. 
43. In accepting the Norman Anderson Trust and opening 
a securities account for said Trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean 
Witter Reynolds became de facto trustees of the Norman Anderson 
Trust. 
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44. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
owed Plaintiff the degree of care and loyalty imposed upon 
trustees by applicable law. 
45. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
breached and violated their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff in 
undertaking the wrongful conduct as hereinabove alleged. 
46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s breach of fiduciary duty, 
Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
47. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter. 
48. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with the prosecution of 
this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENCE) 
49. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are realleged as if set out 
in full herein. 
50. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
owed Plaintiff a duty to not induce or facilitate the violation of 
any provision of the terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement. 
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51. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
breached and violated their duty to Plaintiff as hereinabove 
alleged. 
52. As a direct and proximate result of the careless, 
negligent, reckless, and unlawful acts and omissions of Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Plaintiff has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants as more particularly hereinafter set forth. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defend-
ants Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., jointly and severally, 
as follows: 
A. On Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for breach of 
contract, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For costs of Court incurred herein; and 
(iii) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
B. On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for tortious 
interference with contract, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
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(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated 
to punish and deter; 
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
(iv) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
C. On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for breach of 
fiduciary duty, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For punitive damages in an amount calculated 
to punish and deter; 
(iii) For costs of Court incurred herein including 
reasonable attorney's fees; 
(iv) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises, 
D. On Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for negli-
gence, as follows: 
(i) For damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
(ii) For costs of Court incurred herein; and 
(iii) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
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DATED this 1% day of July, 1991. 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
:ny./rr\ 
•jarfies E. Morton 
At-a^ rneys for Plaintiff 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, 
Thompson, Hatch, Morton & Skeen, hereby demands a trial by jury in 
this matter. 
DATED this 'g(f* day of July, 1991. 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
By c^P^Kfcr^9 
/J'aiaes E. Morton 
(Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
20013 N.E. 42nd St. 
Redmond, Washington 98053 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Mr. Joseph J. Palmer, Mr. Reid E. Lewis, Moyle 
& Draper, Attorneys for Defendants, 600 Deseret Plaza, No. 15 East 
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this \^fj^\ day of July, 
1991. 
t £ z ^ oL/a£veZ^ 
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T^LST AGREE 1E\T 
THIS TRUST ACREEilENT is maae this QC ^ v day c: 
\Zi vlrulvv'^St ^  t 1978, between NORMAN ANDERSON of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter sometimes called the "Trustor" 
and JAMES N. ANDERSON, of Park City, Utah, hereinafter 
sometimes called tne "Trustee". 
Trustor does hereby transfer to the Trustee tne 
property listed on Scnedule "A" and the Trustee agrees to 
hold such property and any other pioperty added to this 
Trust on the terns and conditions stated herein. Trustor 
or any other person or persons may add such other property 
to the trust property as may be acceptable to the Trustee 
by either inter vivos or testamentary transfer; and sucn 
additional property wnen delivered to the Trustee shall 
become a part of the Trust and be held by the Trustee on 
the terms and conditions stated herein. 
ARTICLE I 
DESIGNATION AND PURPOSE OF TRUST 
1.1 Designation. This Trust may be designated 
the NORMAN ANDERSON TPUST. 
1.2 Purpose. This Trust is established for the 
primary benefit of Trustor during Trustor's lifetime and 
of Trustor's family. Trustor's family consists of Trustor's 
wife, Anna Lee Anderson, and Trustor's son, James N. 
Anderson. 
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ARTICLE II 
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL 
DURING THE LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR 
During the lifetime of the Trustor, such part 
or all of the income and/or principal of the trust estate 
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such 
amounts from time to time as the Trustor shall direct in 
writing signed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee; or in 
the absence of such direction, the Trustee shall pay or 
apply for the benefit of a class consisting of Trustor 
and Trustor's wife or any member of such class, such 
amounts to such persons as in his sole and absolute dis-
cretion he deems necessary and proper for the health, 
support, maintenance and welfare of Trustor and said 
wife. 
ARTICLE III 
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL 
UPON DEATH OF TRUSTOR 
3.1 Settlement of Debts and Expenses. Upon 
the death of the Trustor, the Trustee may, in th sole and 
absolute discretion of the Trustee, pay from the Trust or 
advance such sums to the estate or personal representative 
of Trustor, with or without interest, as may be necessary 
for the settlement of Trustor's estate, such amounts as 
expenses of his last illness, funeral and burial, debts 
of the Trustor, inheritance taxes, estate taxes and other 
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taxes lmposec o\ the state or federal covernreit, and any 
and all expenses of administration of Trustor's estate. 
Provided, however, that the foregoing may not be satisfied 
from the proceeds (i) of any life insurance policy on the 
life of Trustor, or (11) of any death benefit payable by 
reason of the Trustor having been a participant in an employee 
benefit plan if such proceeds are not includes in the 
Trustor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 
3.2 Trustor's Family. Upon the death of Trustor, 
the Trustee may make the payments provided in Section 3.1, 
if any, or make adequate provision therefor, and shall 
divide and distribute the trust estate then remaining, 
including income, as follows: 
3.2.1 Wife Not Surviving. If Trustor's 
wife does not survive Trustor (and it is hereby 
directed that for purposes of this Trust if 
Trustor and Trustor's wife shall die under 
circumstances that it is difficult or impossible 
to determine who died first, Trustor's wife shall 
be presumed to have survived Trustor), the Trustee 
shall hold, administer and distribute the trust 
estate, including all assets distributable to 
the Trust by reason of the death of Trustor, in 
one Trust, to be called the "Family Trust" to 
be administered as provided in 3.4. 
3.2.2 Wife Surviving. If Trustor's w^fe 
does survive Trustor, the Trustee shall divide 
the trust estate, including all assets distribu-
table to the Trust by reason of the death of 
Trustor, into two separate trusts, the first to 
be called the "Marital Trust" and the second the 
"Family Trust" to be administered as provided in 
3.3 and 3.4. 
A. Marital Trust Allocation. There 
shall be placed in the Marital Trust 
that portion of the trust estate which 
is equal in value, as finally determined for 
federal estate tax purposes, to the amount 
which is equal to the lesser of 
(1) The maximum allowable marital 
deduction under federal estate tax laws 
or 
(2) The minimum amount which, after 
allowing for any unified credit which has 
not been allowed during Trustor's life-
time, and any other deductions, exemptions 
or credits which will result in no federal 
estate tax being imposed on Trustor's 
estate. 
and which is reduced by the value of any property 
or any interests in property as finally deternmec 
for federal estate tax purposes which passes 
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or has passed from Trustor to Trustor's wife, 
other than through the Marital Trust, by 
reason of said wife being a surviving joint 
tenant, or an insurance beneficiary, inchoate 
dower or any statutory interest similar 
thereto, by operation of law, or otherwise. 
However, there shall not be allocated to tne 
Marital Trust, any property or interest in 
property or the proceeds of any property or 
assets which do not qualify for the marital 
deduction for federal estate tax purposes; 
nor shall there be allocated to the Marital 
Trust except when other assets are insuffi-
cient to satisfy such fractional share, any 
property or interest in property or the 
proceeds of any property or assets (1) with 
respect to which any tax credit or deduction 
shall be available because it is subject to 
both federal estate and federal incore tax; 
or (ii) with respect to which any estate or 
death taxes are paid to any foreign country 
or any of its possessions or subdivisions. 
The Marital Trust shall not be reduced for 
any inheritance or estate taxes, payable as 
a result of the death of Trustor. The Trustee 
must allocate to the Marital Trust property 
or assets, including cash, fairly representative 
of the appreciation or depreciation m t^ e 
value of all property available for distri-
bution to sucn Trust. 
B. Family Trust Allocation. There 
shall be placed in the Family Trust that 
portion of the trust estate not allocated 
to the Marital Trust. 
3.3 Marital Trust. The estate and property of the 
Marital Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts as 
follows: 
3.3.1 Distribution During Lifetime of Wife. 
During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after Trustor's 
death: 
A. The Trustee shall pa> to the 
Trustor's wxfe, commencing as of the date of 
Trustor's death, all of the income from the 
Trust in monthly or other convenient install-
ments, but m no event less frequently than 
in quarter-annual installments; and 
B. Whenever the Trustee determines that 
the funds available to Trustor's wife from 
all sources, including the income from the 
Marital Tr-ast, axe not sxili icier* t iox the 
proper care, maintenance, support and travel, 
including but not limited to the needs arising 
from illness, accident or misfortune of 
Trustor's wife and family, and for funds 
to enable the purchase of residences, the 
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, 
may in his sole discretion pay or distribute 
to Trustor's wife so much of the principal 
of the Trust as he snail deem necessary or 
advisable under the circumstances. 
C. The Trustee shall pay out of 
principal of the Marital Trust such amount 
or amounts, up to the full amount thereof, 
as Trustor's wife shall from time to time 
designate in writing delivered to Trustee 
to any person or persons, including Trustor's 
wife. 
3.3.2 Distributions on Death of Wife. Upon 
the death of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall pay 
over, deliver and distribute all of the rest, 
residue and remainder of the Trust to such per-
sons and parties, including the estate of Trustor's 
wife, as Trustor's wife shall direct or appoint by 
provision of the last will of said wife specifically 
referring to this power of appointment; to the 
extent this general power of appointment is not 
exercised, then upon the death of Trustor's wife 
the Trustee shall continue to hold, aduinister 
and distribute the remainder of the Marital Trust 
as shall not have been appointed by Trustor's 
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wife, suD]ect to ana under the provisions of 3.4. 
3.4 Fanily Trust. The estate and property of tne 
Family Trust shall be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustee for the purposes and upon the uses and trusts 
as follows: 
3.4.1 Distributions During Lifetime of 
Wife. During the lifetime of Trustor's wife after 
Trustor's death, whenever the Trustee determines 
that the funds available to Trustor's wife from all 
sources, including the income and principal from 
the Marital Trust are not sufficient for the proper 
care, maintenance, support and travel, including but 
not limited to the needs arising from illness, 
accident or misfortune of Trustor's wife, and for 
funds to enable the purchase of residences, the 
Trustee, at any time and from time to time, may 
in his sole discretion pay or distribute to Trustor's 
wife so much of the income and/or principal of the 
Trust as he shall deem necessary or advisable under the 
circumstances. 
3*4*2 Distribution on Death of Wife. Upon 
the death of Trustor's wife, if Trustor's wife 
survives Trustor; the Trustee shall distribute the 
remainder of the Family Trust to or for the benefit 
of a class or any member or memners thereof con-
sisting of Trustor's son, the descendants of Trustor's 
son, including any of such descendants now living 
or hereafter born, the spouses of Trustor's son anc 
the spouses of the descendants of Trustor's son 
(including surviving spouses oi Trustor's deceased 
son and his descendants) as Trustor's wife shall direct 
or appoint by provision of the last will of said 
wife specifically referring to this special power 
of appointment; to the extent this special power of 
appointment is not exercised, then upon the death 
of Trustor's wife, the Trustee shall distribute 
the remainder of the Family Trust as shall not have 
been appointed by Trustor's wife to Trustor's son, 
James N. Anderson, if he is then living, but if he 
is not then living to Trustor's son's then living 
descendants, upon the principle of representation, 
sub]ect to the provisions of 3.5. If none of the 
descendants of Trustor are then living, the Trustee 
shall distribute the entire trust estate tc the 
heirs at law of Trustor as determined pursuant to 
the laws of descent and distribution of tne State 
of Utah in effect at such time as if Trustor had 
died at such time. 
3.4.3 Distribution on Death of Trustor. 
Upon Trustor's death if Trustor's wife does not 
survive Trustor, the Trustee shall distribaye the 
Family Trust to Trustor's son, James N. Anderson, 
if he is then living but if he is not then living to 
Trustor's son's then living descendants upon the 
principle of representation, sub}ect to tse provisions 
-10-
of 3.5. If none of the descendants of Trustor are 
then living, the Trustee shall distribute the entire 
trust estate to the heirs at law of Truster as deter-
mined pursuant to the laws of descent and distri-
bution of the State of Utah m effect at such time 
as if Trustor had died at such time. 
3*5 Minor Beneficiaries Trust. If under any 
provision of this Trust any beneficiary becomes entitled 
to final distribution of any share or portion of the trust 
estate and such beneficiary is not of the age of 21 years, 
the share of such beneficiary shall be retained by the 
Trustee, until such beneficiary attains the age of 21 
years, paying out such portion of the income and principal 
thereof as the Trustee in its sole discretion deems necessary 
or advisable to provide for the care, comfort, support, 
maintenance and education of such beneficiary and distri-
buting any undistributed portion of such share or portion 
of a share to such beneficiary when ne or she attains 
the age of 21 years, or to his or her estate if he or 
she should die before attaining the age of 21 years. 
ARTICLE IV 
AMENDMENT OR REVOCATION 
4.1 During Lifetime of Trustor. The Trustor 
reserves the right at any time or times to amend or revoke 
this instrument and the trusts hereunder, in whole or in 
part, by an instrument or instruments in writing signed 
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by Trustor and delivered m Trustor s lifetir.e to the 
Trustee. If this instrument is revoked in its entirety, 
the revocation shall take effect upon the delivery of the 
required writing to the Trustee. On the revocation of this 
instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to 
the Trustor, or as Trustor may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the trust property. 
4.2 By Will of Trustor. The Trustor reserves 
the right to amend or revoke this instrument and the trusts 
hereunder, in whole or in part, by his last will which 
specifically refers to this instrument and specifically 
directs what amendments are to be made or states that 
the instrument is revoked. If this instrument is revoked 
in its entirety by tne last will cf the Trustor, the Trustee 
shall deliver to the Trustor's estate, or as Trustor's 
will may direct, all of the trust property. 
4.3 Acceptance by Trustee. If this Trust or 
any provision thereof is amended, the amendment shall 
take effect only when accepted in writing by the Trustee. 
This Trust shall be irrevocable and unamendable during 
any period of incompetency of the Trustor and shall become 
irrevocable and unamendable upon the death of the Trustor 
or prior thereto if by amendment Trustor has relinquished 
all of Trustor's rignt to amend or revoke this instrument. 
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ARTICLE V 
POWTRS OF TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall have all of the powers as stated 
in Part 4 of Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and 
entitled Uniform Trustee's Powers Provisions In addition 
thereto and not by way of limitation, the Trustee shall 
have the power, to retain any asset originally or later 
contributed to the trust estate whether or not such asset 
be of a character permissible for investment by fiduciaries; 
to retain and purchase assets with a view to possible 
increase in value notwithstanding the amount or absence 
of income therefrom; to retain and purchase assets not-
withstanding the lack of diversification of the trust 
assets; to retain, purchase, sell or exchange any and all 
stocks, bonds, notes or other securities or any variety 
of real or personal property, including stocks or interests 
in investments, mutual funds to make distributions of 
principal or income in kind; to enter into any transaction, 
including, but not limited by advancing funds, purchasing 
assets, selling assets (and paying, with or without arrange-
ments for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settle-
ment of the estate of Trustor) with the Trustee or legal 
representative of any other trust or estate in which any 
beneficiary hereunder has any beneficial interest even thougn 
such Trustee or legal representative is also Trustee here-
under; and to commingle the funds and assets of any trust 
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estate hereunder with any other trust estate nereuncer so 
long as proper records are Kept of tne assets allocao^-
to any such trust. 
ARTICLE VI 
INSURANCE PROVISIONS 
6.1 Power in the Trustor. The Trustor reserves 
the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent 
or approval of the Trustee, to sell, assign or hypothecate 
any policies of insurance made payable to the Trustee 
hereunder, to exercise any option or privilege grantee by 
such policies, including, but without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiary of 
such policies, and to receive all payments, dividends, 
surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind wnich 
may accrue on account of such policies during Trustor's 
lifetime. Furthermore, the Trustee agrees to deliver to 
the Trustor on Trustor's written request signed by Trustor 
and delivered to Trustee any of such policies depositee 
with the Trustee hereunder. 
6.2 Duties of Trustee. The Trustee shall hold 
any policies of insurance which may be deposited wit*1 
him, but without any obligation to pay premiums, assess-
ments or other charges upon any of the policies or to 
otherwise preserve them or any of them as binding con-
tracts of insurance. Upon the death of the insured or 
upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payaole 
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to the Trustee, the Trustee shall take such proceedings as 
in his judgment he shall deem necessary to collect all 
proceeds due on the policies and he may, if he so elects, 
exercise any settlement options available under the policies. 
The Trustee is authorized to compromise and adjust claims 
arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terirs 
and conditions as the Trustee shall deem advisable, and to 
the extent necessary may maintain or defend amy suit, 
provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no dutv 
to maintain or enter into any litigation unless his expenses, 
including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or 
guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably satis-
factory to the Trustee. The Trustee may repay any advances 
made by him or reimburse himself for any such fees and costs 
out of the principal or income of this Trust. The receipt 
of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge 
of the insurer and Trustee alone shal] thereafter be required 
to see to the application of the proceeds. 
ARTICLE VII 
THE TRUSTEE 
7.1 Accounting. With respect to each separate 
trust created herein, the Trustee shall render annually 
an account of income and principal, including a statement 
of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to 
all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to 
the natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries, upon, 
bat only upon the request of any such beneficiary. 
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7.2 Bond. No bond shall be required of the 
original Trustee hereunder or of any successor trustee 
or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond 
shall be required. 
7.3 Compensation. The Trustee shall be entitled 
to a reasonable fee for his services commensurate with 
fees charged by corporate trustees in Salt Lake City, Utah 
for similar services. The Trustee may charge a reasonable 
fee for transfers to a successor trustee and for any final 
distribution of any share of the trust estate based upon the 
work involved in such transfer or final distribution. 
7.4 Resignation. The Trustee may resign at any 
time by giving thirty (30) days written notice to Trustor, 
or, after the death of the Trustor, to Trustor's wife. 
Upon such notice, Trustor, or after the death of Trustor, 
Trustor's wife may appoint a successor trustee. If no such 
appointment is made within thirty (30) days after the 
Trustee gives its notice of resignation, then the District 
Court of Salt Lake County or any judge thereof may appoint 
a successor trustee upon application of the resigning 
Trustee or of any other interested party. 
7-5 Removal. The Trustee may be removed by the 
Trustor or after the death of the Trustor, by Trustor's 
wife by giving thirty (30) days written notice signed 
by Trustor, or Trustor's wife, as the case may be and 
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delivered to Trustee, in whicn the successor trustee 
is designated to the then acting Trustee. 
7.6 Successor Trustee. A successor trustee may 
be either a corporation authorized under applicable law to 
act as trustee or an individual. Any such successor trustee 
shall act as Trustee hereunder without the execution or 
filing of any writing or any further action on the part of 
Trustor or of his wife or of any beneficiary hereunder. Upon 
the appointment of a successor trustee, the former Trustee 
shall promptly make an accounting and distribute all 
assets of the trust estate to the successor trustee. An 
additional or successor trustee shall not be liable for 
any action taken by the Trustee prior to the time such 
additional or successor trustee becomes a trustee. 
ARTICLE VIII 
MISCELLANEOUS 
8.1 Powers of Appointment. The power of the 
donee over any power of appointment granted in this agree-
ment shall include all lawful exercises thereof, without 
limitation, specifically including but not limited to, 
the power to make appointments outright to, or to a trustee 
to hold in trust for the exclusive benefit of, any one or 
more of the object of the power; to create life estates 
and other limited estates; to create general and special 
powers of appointment and to appoint subject to lawful 
spendthrift restrictions and other lawful conditions, pro-
vided that no one other than an object of the power is 
benefited thereby. 
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8.2 Spenct-rirt Clause. The interest or eacn 
beneficiary in the mcone or principal of any trust created 
hereunder shall be free from the control or interference 
of any creditor of a beneficiary or of any spouse of a 
married beneficiary and shall not be subject to attachment 
or susceptible of anticipation or alienation. Nothing con-
tained in this paragraph 8.2 shall be construed as restrictirg 
in any way the exercise of any pouer or discretion granted 
hereunder. 
8.3 Definitions. References herein to "child" 
or "children" refer only to the child designated in 
Article I. References herein to "descendant" or "descendants" 
shall mean lawful blood descendants in the first, second or 
other degree of the ancestor designated andr in all such 
cases, (a) an adopted child and such adopted child's law-
ful blood descendants shall be considered as lawful blood 
descendants of the adopting parent or parents and of anyone 
who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting 
parent or of either of the adopting parents, and (b) a 
child in gestation which is later born alive shall be 
regarded as a child in being during the period of gestation. 
8.4 Governing Law. This agreement has been 
accepted by the Trustee in the State of Utah and all 
questions concerning its construction shall be governed 
by the laws of that state. All questions concerning the 
administration of the Trust shaLl be governed by the laws 
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of the jurisdiction in whicn the principal office of the 
Trustee (from time to time acting) is located. 
8.5 Invalid Provisions. If any provision of 
this Trust is held to be invalid, none of the other pro-
visions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative, 
but such provisions shall be given full force and effect 
as herein provided. If any provisions of this trust 
instrument violate the rules against perpetuities now or 
hereafter in effect, in the state within which this Trust 
is being administered, that portion of the trust or trusts 
so affected shall be administered as herein provided until 
the termination of the maximum period authorized by law, 
at which time and forthwith such part of the said trust 
estate so affected shall be distributed in fee simple to 
the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in 
which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so 
terminated. For purposes of computing such time rules, 
the lives in being shall be those of the Trustor, Trustor's 
wife and their descendants living at the time the trust 
or trusts herein established become irrevocable. 
8.6 Residence Property. If any residence of 
Trustor or Trustor's wife is or becomes a part of any 
trust estate created hereunder, the Trustee is authorized 
and directed to allow Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either 
of them, to use and occupy any such residence without payment 
of rent therefor for so long as Trustor and Trustor's wife, 
or either of them, continue to so occupy such residence or 
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residences. During such occupancy, Truster nereo^ authorizes 
but does not direct Trustee, to pay, in his discretion, 
from the income or principal of the trust estate wn.ch 
holds an interest in any such residence, any taxes, assess-
ments, fire and casualty and liabiLity insurance premiums, 
maintenance costs, ordinary repairs and replacements and 
reasonable improvements for any such residence. Witn the 
written consent of Trustor, or after Trustor's deatn, 
Trustor's wife, signed by Trustor or Trustor's wife, as 
the case may be, and delivered to Trustee, the Trustee 
may sell such residence. If requested in such writing 
the proceeds of the sale (together with any additional 
assets of the trust estate) shall be used by the Trustee 
to purchase, acquire, or build a substitute residence, 
taking title in the name of the Trustee and allowing 
Trustor and Trustor's wife, or either of them, to occupy 
such residence on the terms previously set out in tnis 
paragraph. If a substitute residence is not requested in 
such writing, the proceeds of the sale of any sucn residence 
shall be held, administered and distributee by the Trustee 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust estate involved without 
regard to this paragraph. 
8.7 Trustee May Rely on Wills - Presumption 
In ascertaining whether there has been an amendment of this 
Trust by the last will of the Trustor or whetner tnere has 
been an exercise of any powers which have been granted to 
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any beneficiary nerem arc whicn may be exercised by anv 
such beneficiary's last *ill, tne Trustee shall be protectee 
in relying upon an instrument admitted to probate in any 
jurisdiction as the last will of the Trustor or as the last 
will of any beneficiary who has such a power. Unless the 
Trustee has actual notice of the admission to probate of 
such a will within 6 months after the death of Trustor or 
any such beneficiary, it will be conclusively presumed 
that no such will has been admitted to probate, that no 
such will exists and that the Trustor or beneficiary, as 
the case may be, died intestate and the trust estate shall 
be administered accordingly whether or not such a will is 
thereafter found to exist. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOr, this instrument has been 
signed as of the day and year first above written. 
NORJ1AN ANDERSON 
"Trustor" 
JAMES N. ANDERSON 
.U. ,j// A . /. . rg 
' / "Trustee 
JAMES E. MORTON, A3739 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS, #4699 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant ; 
vs. ; 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC, | 
a Foreign Corporation, RALPH ] 
PAHNKE, and JOHN DOES 1 ] 
through 25, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. 
i NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i Trial Court No. 900907186CN 
i Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff/Appellant, Anna Lee 
Anderson, through counsel James E. Morton of Thompson, Hatch, 
Morton & Skeen, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
final Orders of the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick entered in this 
matter on September 16, 1991 and September 27, 1991. These 
Orders dismissed this action in its entirely from which, 
Plaintiff/Appellant hereby appeals. 
DATED t h i s fffjfc day of October , 1991 . 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
ltf& 
fAMESE. MORTON 
Att^oisieys for Plaintiff 
reliant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed to Joseph J. 
Palmer, Reid E. Lewis at Moy le; and Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, #15 
East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this day 
of October, 1991. 
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